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by the state and private companies.1 That was the case in the USA as it 
rose to dominate the Western market for nuclear reactors by the mid- 
1960s. Engineers and  scientists also played a crucial role in other advanced 
economies such as Germany when they began to scout out the sector. But 
what about underdeveloped economies? We aim at analysing the role of 
engineers and scientists as agents of economic modernization in Spain, 
which at the time was an underdeveloped economy ruled by an authori-
tarian regime.
The Spanish nuclear law of 1964 responded both to the pressure of the 
private electricity companies to procure the nuclear business for them-
selves and to the industrialization strategy propelled by the dictatorship.2 
A handful of modernizing engineers and scientists were decisive in the 
process. Presas,3 as well as Camprubi,4 unveiled the key role of Otero 
Navascués who was directing the Nuclear Energy Board projects. We 
know far less of the other engineers and scientists who joining interna-
tional networks, transferred technological/scientific knowledge and 
trained qualified teams within Spain. They also acted as commercial 
agents. Acquiring foreign atomic technology required specialized knowl-
edge in order to decide which of the different alternatives available in the 
market to choose. Engineers and scientists stayed at the core of all com-
mercial negotiations and transactions involving nuclear technology. One 
of their basic tools was the cultivation of good relationships in order to 
influence institutions, industry, experts and especially policymakers, who 
had the last word. Finally, the history of the nuclear programme was 
determined by a very small group of people for whom mutual knowledge 
and trust were essential. Making use of new archival sources,5 this chap-
ter identifies some of these actors, in particular the Spanish industrial 
engineers Jaime MacVeigh and Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines and the 
German scientist Karl Wirtz. These three actors played a strategic role in 
 promoting the Spanish nuclear programme. But in order to understand 
the role played by these engineers, we first introduce the global market 
for nuclear reactors from the 1950s to the 1980s and explain that Spain 
became the principal market for the major international manufacturers 
of nuclear reactors during the decade between the mid-1960s and the 
mid-1970s.
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 The Global Market for Nuclear Reactors 
1950s–1980s: Spain as a Major Client
On 20 December 1951, electricity was first generated from nuclear power 
at the EBR-I (experimental breeder reactor I) in Idaho, USA.6 Yet the 
beginning of civil nuclear power is commonly set at President Eisenhower’s 
address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 
1953, later called the ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech.7 Most civil nuclear pro-
grammes around the world began and grew from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
The first nuclear reactors connected to the electricity grid—Obninsk in 
the Soviet Union by 1954, Calder Hall in the UK by 1956 and 
Shippingport in the USA by 1957—proved the concept, but were far 
from being commercially viable. They were small (5 MW, 50 MW and 
90  MW respectively), each applying dissimilar technologies and with 
plenty of unknowns to be solved. Eventually, three types of reactors were 
commercialized internationally. The light water nuclear power reactor, 
using low enriched uranium as its fuel and ordinary water as its coolant 
and moderator, was built originally to a US design in Western countries 
and to a similar Soviet design in the USSR and Eastern European coun-
tries; The gas graphite reactor using natural uranium as its fuel, moderated 
by graphite and cooled by carbon dioxide, was a technological design 
favoured by the UK and France. Finally, Canada marketed a quite  different 
nuclear power reactor using natural uranium as its fuel and heavy water as 
its coolant and moderator. In the end, it was the light-water reactor pro-
moted by the USA that was triumphant over the more expensive gas-
cooled reactors built by the British and the French in the 1950s.8
However, until the introduction of ‘turnkey projects’ in the nuclear 
business in 1962, with a bid for the construction of a plant at Oyster 
Creek, New Jersey, the commercial market for nuclear reactors remained 
stagnant. So did the international market: a total of ten reactors were 
ordered internationally up to 1964, with a few other reactors domesti-
cally ordered and under construction in the USA, the UK and the USSR.9 
The turnkey plants were offered by the nuclear reactor building compa-
nies at a guaranteed fixed price, set in advance, competitive with coal- 
and oil-fired alternatives. Even if in the long term it proved to be a bad 
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business, in which the manufacturers lost money,10 turnkey projects pro-
pelled domestic and international sales of nuclear reactors. Up to 1975, 
some 245 commercial reactors had begun to be built around the world in 
the thirty or so countries that decided to pursue nuclear energy. Of those, 
almost one hundred were ordered and were beginning to be built in the 
USA alone. All the US reactors were domestically built by five American 
manufacturers (General Electric, Westinghouse, Babcock &Wilcox, 
Combustion Engineering and Atomic General).
Just over one hundred reactors were ordered internationally (including 
Soviet sales to Eastern countries). General Electric and Westinghouse 
captured, with the help of US economic diplomacy and the financial 
assistance of the Export–Import Bank, almost 80% of the international 
sales of nuclear reactors to the Western countries up to the mid-1970s. 
During the second half of the 1970s, other Western manufacturers, 
which had been gaining experience by building nuclear plants in their 
countries, came to compete in the international market, mostly the 
German Kraftwerk Union, the French Framatome and the Canadian 
AECL. The British mostly failed to market their Magnox reactor to the 
world, while the Russians imposed their technology on the Eastern Bloc. 
By 1975, the curve of orders had already passed its peak in the USA.11 
Worldwide, 1976 marked the historical maximum of nuclear power 
plants beginning to be constructed, with building works being initiated 
for forty-three new nuclear plants.12 Coincidentally, 1976 also saw the 
last governmental authorization for a new nuclear power plant in Spain.
As an early adopter of nuclear energy, by 1973 Spain already ranked 
third among countries, with the largest share of nuclear electricity over 
total electricity produced and being the seventh largest producer in the 
West.13 In fact, over the first half of the 1970s, the Spanish electricity 
utilities became the largest nuclear clients of world nuclear manufactur-
ers, just ahead of Japan and South Korea.14 All the major international 
nuclear companies attempted to break into the Spanish market, which 
was the fastest growing nuclear power developer in Europe at the time.15 
The remainder of this chapter aims to expose the role that engineers and 
scientist played in helping the destitute, internationally ostracized and 
dictatorial country that was Spain become a relevant player in the global 
nuclear market.
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 Nuclear Optimism and Energy Planning 
by Entrepreneurs and Engineers: MacVeigh 
and Cortines as Atomic Leaders
In Spain, experience in managing large engineering works, handling 
credit and establishing contact with the USA and European firms enabled 
the electrical lobby to take on the nuclear programme. Since the 1940s, 
the electricity companies had built up groups that comprised highly 
skilled engineers who were used to collaborating with foreign experts on 
large engineering projects. Some industrial engineers became the true 
architects of the Spanish nuclear strategy, taking on the functions of busi-
ness leadership, project management, public dissemination of energy 
policy and the orchestration of a lobby. This is our main hypothesis. 
These engineers had first-hand knowledge of what the USA had been 
doing since 1945, but also knew of the limitations of Spanish industrial 
capacities. They frequented the meetings of the Atomic Industrial Forum 
in New York and reacted to the business expectations that were put for-
ward at the 1955 Geneva Conference. Upon return from Switzerland, a 
group of these industry captains had a meeting with General Franco to 
convey their objectives the nuclear programme should be the responsibil-
ity of private enterprises.16 It was unclear at this stage whether the nuclear 
civil programme was to be a private endeavour in Spain or whether it 
would continue in the hands of the government’s Nuclear Energy Board 
(JEN).17 A British report summarized the situation in early 1957: at least 
80% of the electrical supply industry was controlled by a few private 
companies in association with the main Spanish banks; the electrical 
engineering industry was developing on a fairly satisfactory scale stimu-
lated by the demand from state and private power production schemes; 
the larger utility firms were closely associated with French, German and 
US firms under patent agreements.18 ‘The range of small products is 
increasing rapidly, but there is no plant for production of the massive 
electrical generating components required in modern base load sta-
tions.’19 The utilities therefore knew their weaknesses and recognized the 
need to establish strategic alliances.
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The next step entailed the creation of two business consortia to build 
nuclear power stations in regions that were historically controlled by pri-
vate enterprises, thus enabling them to distribute a substantial part of the 
future of the nuclear market and reinforce their unequivocal commit-
ment. The Northern Nuclear Plants SA (Nuclenor: Iberduero and Electra 
Viesgo) and the Centrales Nucleares SA (Cenusa: Unión Eléctrica 
Madrileña, Hidroeléctrica Española and Sevillana de Electricidad) for the 
southern region were founded by electrical and financial entrepreneurs 
but managed by engineers.20
Jaime MacVeigh Alfós (191?–1985),21 and Manuel Gutiérrez-Cortines 
(1901–1980),22 were two of them. Both were industrial engineers and had 
developed contacts with foreign firms. Son of a counsellor of the Hispano-
American Bank, MacVeigh finished his studies in the School of Industrial 
Engineers of Madrid in 1943. Between 1945 and 1950, engenieer MacVeigh 
had a managing role within the Spanish TALGO project (Tren Articulado 
Ligero Goicoechea Oriol, Goicoechea-Oriol light articulated train). The con-
struction of the famous articulated train was  made in conjunction with 
American Car & Foundry, taking MacVeigh to some of the nuclear industry 
sites in Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey. Upon his return to Madrid, 
he abandoned TALGO and was hired by the Banco Urquijo. MacVeigh 
went on to specialize in nuclear projects, convinced that they offered ‘the 
solution to Spain’s electric problem’.23 Cortines, in the other hand, was man-
aging director of Standard Electric in Spain and Portugal before the civil war. 
From 1940, he worked as counsellor in Electra Viesgo, one of the future 
partners who built Garoña nuclear power plant (NPP) in the 1960s.
Between 1956 and 1962, MacVeigh and Cortines, as technical advi-
sors and counsellors for Cenusa and Nuclenor respectively, developed a 
very long-term expansion strategy. Together with the most significant 
executives of the electric companies, both engineers participated in the 
Assessment Commission of Industrial Reactors (CARDI) at the Spanish 
Nuclear Energy Board (JEN), where they established alliances with scien-
tists, experts and businessmen.24 MacVeigh’s public presence had been 
constant since 1955, spreading the idea that Spain should bet on the 
economy of the atom. His political and business contacts abroad allowed 
him to know precisely the technological advances that were being made 
in the USA and in Europe. Indirectly these two engineers contributed to 
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the turn of the governement’s industrial policy that left the business of 
nuclear power plants in the hands of private firms. In short, these two 
men become a turning point in the commitment to nuclear power and in 
the maturation of an industrial sector that was unprecedented in Spain. 
In 1957, MacVeigh collaborated in founding the nuclear engineering 
company Técnicas Atómicas (Tecnatom SA).25 Through this company, 
MacVeigh directed and led the project of the first Spanish nuclear plant 
on the Tajo river, at Zorita, and meanwhile Cortines initiated the drafts 
for the so-called Ebro–Bilbao nuclear power station. Simultaneously 
both leaders networked with the national atomic agencies of the USA 
and the UK, as much as with the chief multinationals in the atomic busi-
ness. Last but not least, they negotiated contracts with international 
banks and suppliers and supervised the building process once it began. 
They shared learning and commercial trips. As Cortines wrote some years 
later, one of the reasons why the Spanish programme had adopted three 
different technologies was the negotiations undertaken by each company. 
Each reactor belonged to a different utility and ‘all of them were offered 
under excellent economic conditions’.26
Why this passion for nuclear energy? Firstly, because it was a political 
decision, ‘Atoms for a dictatorship’.27 Francoism embraced the nuclear 
programme for military and economic reasons. Nevertheless, and sec-
ondly, we believe that it was possible not only because of the times of 
atomic optimism in which the Geneva Conference opened, but also 
because it was technologically one of the main challenges for engineers of 
the mid-twentieth century. And of course, the electrical utilities saw a 
business opportunity to conquer and, in Spain, they had excellent politi-
cal contacts through which to do this. In this sense we can understand 
why the first non-governmental technical/economic report on the need 
to incorporate nuclear energy into the Spanish energy matrix was pro-
duced by the Research Service of Banco Urquijo, an industrial bank with 
important interests in electricity, in February 1957.28 Entitled ‘Essay on 
a nuclear programme for Spain’ (Ensayo sobre un programa de energía 
nuclear en España) and written by Jaime MacVeigh, it concluded that 
before 1970 Spain would face a major deficit of traditional electricity 
generation that could only be offset by introducing nuclear power. Given 
the urgent need to meet the excess demand, MacVeigh urged in his essay 
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that work should start on the first commercial nuclear power plants no 
later than 1964 and continue after that at an exponential rate.29 MacVeigh’s 
hypothesis on the growth between 5% and 7% annual of the Spanish 
electric demand from 1950 to 2000 proved to be excessively conservative 
in the short and medium term, although remarkably precise in the long 
term. His nuclear projections, however, were extremely optimistic. At the 
height of the Spanish nuclear programme, in the final phase of the dicta-
torship between 1971 and 1976, the installed capacity would never have 
exceeded 33 GW if all the projects that the utilities applied for had 
become operational.30 This engineer knew the obstacles that a project 
such as the one he was proposing would have to face. MacVeigh recog-
nized that the technical problems had been solved but the economic ones 
had not.31 The report from the Urquijo Research Service admitted that 
the cost of nuclear kWh produced at commercial nuclear power plants at 
that time was no less than twice the current fossil fuel costs. MacVeigh 
further stated in his essay that the order of magnitude of investments in 
nuclear power plants from 1965 to 2000 would have to be between 150 
and 280 billion pesetas of 1955 (from $14 to $25 billion at the official 
exchange rate). That was excluding the additional facilities that a nuclear 
programme would entail. Including those, the full development of the 
programme could account for 25–40% more.32 In other words it was a 
great opportunity to do business and to promote the industrialization of 
the country.
MacVeigh, Cortines and other businessmen and technocrats were 
invited to visit the British nuclear installations in 1957. Although in the 
end the British did not get any atomic contracts from Spain, this contact 
was very important for the utilities’ managers. For instance, a report titled 
‘Training and Construction Programme for a Nuclear Power Project in 
Spain’ summarized what should be the process of training a team of engi-
neers to build an atomic plant. In 1958, MacVeigh conducted a training 
course for senior executives that would be very useful in the Zorita proj-
ect. Briefly, and according to the British experts, the most important con-
sideration was to nominate at the earliest possible moment the chief 
engineer for the whole project, since this training would be of long 
 duration, and he must be allowed to choose his own staff. The  requirements 
for the chief engineer were that he should have considerable experience in 
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construction of conventional power station plants, as well as strong tech-
nical and administrative ability to draw up enquiries for tenders and to 
supervise construction of the plant. During the first year, the chief engi-
neer’s main task would be to recruit his team and to start its training at the 
Hartwell Reactor School and with the Calder construction teams. The 
complete team would contain a similar number of engineers experienced 
in conventional power station practice, covering such areas as turbines, 
alternators, instrumentation and switchgear. The chief engineer would 
pay visits to the industrial firms from whom tenders were being sought 
and would also spend some time at the research station operated by JEN 
in Spain and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Construction 
could be started within three months of planning an order and should be 
in operation about three-and-a-half years afterwards. The chief engineer 
would supervise construction and ultimately operation of the station, and 
he would supervise the contractors with the assistance of his design engi-
neers, the operation superintendent and the maintenance engineer.33 
Eventually, MacVeigh as chief advisor of Tecnatom would apply this very 
same strategy in the first plant that was built in Spain, but using American 
firms instead.
On a commercial mission to England in 1960, MacVeigh made a rel-
evant situation diagnosis. His company’s plans relied on the government’s 
opinion. He believed that the Spanish industry could participate in a 
conventional power station by manufacturing turbines, instrumentation, 
alternators and steam raising equipment, but excluding the fuel cycle. For 
this reason, he considered the JEN trials to be a big mistake. MacVeigh 
declared himself a supporter of the plan to import the reactor and stated 
that he was familiar with the US financial facilities. To achieve this, it was 
necessary to influence the decision-makers. Gutiérrez-Cortines person-
ally told Minister of Industry Joaquín Planell that the companies ‘doubted 
whether the government intended allowing the private utilities to build 
nuclear stations’. The answer was ‘the Government would support […] at 
the appropriate time’.34 The problem, in fact, was that the people in 
charge of the autarkist policy were still in their posts and did not under-
stand the meaning of the new economic policy. By late 1961, MacVeigh 
was more forceful in his strategy and drafted a confidential report wherein 
he was critical of the policy of the JEN and its President.35 This report 
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was given to López Bravo, manager director of Spanish Foreign Currency 
Institute (IEME), and soon after to become Industry Minister. In 
MacVeigh’s opinion, JEN’s plan to proceed with the experimental proj-
ects was illusory and expensive. Moreover, the fuel cycle would not be 
viable until 1970 and would be hardly able to cover the needs for ura-
nium; this would delay the rollout of the power stations. Therefore, 
MacVeigh’s report advised supporting the private initiative that was pre-
pared to immediately construct ‘a small and standard plant with a future’; 
it would be of the ‘boiling water’ type and come at a ‘reasonable’ cost. 
Those running the Zorita project firmly believed that they had to speed 
up the nuclear race by using US technology and collaborating with the 
Spanish private companies. MacVeigh was right to consider that every-
thing depended on two essential factors: ‘the capacity of Spanish indus-
try’ to respond to this challenge and ‘the (economic) liberalisation’ that 
access to the foreign market would provide.36 No doubt MacVeigh knew 
whom he was addressing. López Bravo—‘Mr. Efficiency’ as he was nick-
named by a well-known banker—would have all the authority and the 
last word in awarding the nuclear programme and the tenders. IEME’s 
manager was responsible for liberalizing the foreign currency market and 
foreign transactions, and as the Minister of Industry promoted an indus-
trial policy that was favourable to foreign capital in general terms, and to 
American firms in particular.
Furthermore, Cortines and MacVeigh collaborated in founding the 
Spanish Atomic Forum (Fórum Atómico Españo, FAE) at the end of 
1961. FAE became the Spanish nuclear lobby, since it was an alliance of 
industries that sought a market niche in nuclear energy: steel, 
 metal- mechanical, shipbuilding, chemical and electronic companies, in 
addition to electricity producers and distributors and engineering and 
consulting firms. FAE had the support of public and semi-official entities 
and became part of the European Atomic Forum (Foratom), a necessary 
link for its internationalization and for complying with nuclear safety 
regulations. In addition, as vice-presidents of the lobby, MacVeigh and 
Cortines were counted among the instigators of the project for a European 
fast fusion reactor, necessarily encountering scientists and the atomic 
business ecosystem in Europe and North America. In fact, FAE and the 
Spanish Nuclear Board organized several meetings with French, British, 
North American and Western German industries during the 1960s.
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It should be noted that Spanish industry did not start from zero. The 
experience gained in conventional thermal power plants, at least since 
1950, had allowed engineers to conduct major projects and develop 
mechanical and electrical assembly techniques. In addition, the factories 
making specialized machinery and auxiliary equipment for the genera-
tion and industrial use of electricity, sometimes with foreign patents, had 
benefited from manufacturing growth during the 1950s.37 The nuclear 
programme was identified as an opportunity. These companies had to 
innovate in product, techniques, knowledge and management. The man-
ufacture of capital goods and industrial assemblies requires large-scale 
engineering and consulting services. Some of these firms were born at the 
time and others, which already existed, adapted to the new challenge by 
diversifying their production lines and building up strategic links with 
foreign companies. This was a way in which to solve the two great short-
comings of the Spanish companies: capital and knowledge. In MacVeigh’s 
words, nuclear participation meant ‘improving, in general, its construc-
tion and productivity standards’.38 The challenge was to build the first 
nuclear power plants. Zorita and Garoña were the litmus test for 
MacVeigh and Cortines.
While Cortines served as an executive officer,39 MacVeigh acted as a 
chief engineer with some additional management functions. Even though 
Cortines referred to Garoña as ‘my nuclear plant’, the execution of the 
contract was the direct responsibility of the American multinational. 
General Electric coordinated, controlled and subcontracted all phases of 
the project through its subsidiary GE Technical Services Co. (GETSCO). 
So Cortines negotiated capital goods contracts and financial credits, but 
was not directing the works. On the contrary, Westinghouse Electric 
International and its subsidiary Westinghouse Atomic Power of Spain 
relied on Tecnatom, the Spanish consultancy directed by MacVeigh, to 
supervise the entire Zorita’s project of engineering and management. Why 
did WEICO confer so much responsibility on a local consulting firm that 
GE disregarded? In 1965, Tecnatom was only a little company, with a 
small but highly qualified staff, and with more theoretical knowledge than 
experience in atomic technology. It is true that Garoña was triple the size 
of Zorita, which made the project more complex. GE had to consider, 
with good reason, that the Spanish engineering and  consultants were still 
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at an embryonic stage, considering the degree of specialization, technical 
assistance and learning that were required. Our hypothesis is that the 
main intangible was embodied in the figure of the advisor-delegate 
MacVeigh, the project leader who had worked in USA, communicated 
well in English and personally knew WEICO and also possessed the 
knowledge and contacts to operate in a complicated country such as 
Franco’s Spain. With all this, MacVeigh could convince the Americans 
and the policymakers and impose his criteria. MacVeigh put into practice 
a very personal management structure in Zorita NPP.  He negotiated 
import licences and dollars with the Spanish authorities and contracted 
logistics in Europe or the USA for the transport of the vessel and the reac-
tor. He also supervised the exit and return of the Spanish uranium to be 
enriched in America, and agreed loans with public and private banks 
abroad in a variety of different currencies.40
Once the power plant programme was in place, the Minister of 
Industry gave priority to the future fast breeder reactor. López Bravo 
again sought the support of the JEN and the nuclear industry. MacVeigh 
and Cortines also played a key role. On this occasion, they sought to 
approach European partners and use their old networks in the UK, 
France and West Germany. The point of connection was the supply of 
uranium for Zorita NPP. At least since 1962, the UKAEA and Tecnatom 
had held meetings and negotiations on this issue. According to a British 
memorandum of September 1968, the Spanish government was very 
interested in advancing this new technological development. The Energy 
Director in the Ministry for Industry, ‘who is from private industry’, 
expressed that Spain needed nuclear power and the fast reactor seemed 
the most promising way of obtaining it. He asked about the British plan 
and requested a visit to the Dounreay installations. Some days later 
MacVeigh confirmed his own interest in the fast breeder. ‘He knew in 
outline’ of the British proposal for Spain and confessed that the American 
Betchell were ‘very impressed indeed with the British fast reactor position 
and were convinced’ that ‘it would be adopted in the USA’. MacVeigh 
‘was personally prepared to back it and recommend his organisations, 
Tecnatom and UEM, to put money into it’. The report concluded by 
stating that ‘as you know MacVeigh is an influential man in Spain and is 
a very good friend of ours’.41
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However, MacVeigh’s time at Tecnatom was running out. This consult-
ing engineering company had been created to build Zorita. Once com-
pleted and connected to the network in 1969, Tecnatom entered a phase of 
uncertainty. The board of directors was given a two year trial period, after 
which its future would be evaluated, not excluding the possibility of dissolv-
ing the company. This situation was perhaps decisive in MacVeigh’s decision 
to leave the company in late 1969.42 Banco Atlántico hired him, a firm 
linked to the finances of Opus Dei and expanding its industrial businesses. 
Meanwhile, Cortines acceded to the presidency of the Spanish Atomic 
Forum and to the council of the European Forum, and tried to advance the 
development of the fast reactor with partners in Europe and America.
 From Scientific Knowledge to Entrepreneurial 
Ecosystem: Karl Wirtz and the Spanish Atomic 
Programme
The technological and financial challenges entailed by atomic develop-
ment led to the early appearance of international projects during the 
1950s. The idea was to share experiences, costs and financial risks in this 
new sector, which still had uncertain technological potential. Karl Wirtz, 
one of the scientists behind the atomic bomb of Hitler’s Third Reich, had 
been considered ‘an old friend of Spain’ by the JEN since at least 1949. 
Private firms, entrepreneurs, diplomatic services and political decision- 
makers played an important role in shaping the Spanish atomic network 
between the 1950s and 1970s. However, no national or international 
atomic programme can be understood from reductionist approaches that 
refuse to interrelate politics, technology, commerce and culture.43 Nor 
can such a programme be explained by one sole actor. In contrast, only 
an investigation of the connections between all social spaces and multiple 
actors enables the development of a historical explanation. In addition, 
these actors moved in substantially different political and economic con-
texts. We need only mention the political distance between Franco’s 
Spain and the economic development policy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany(West Germany), a country that was democratic, industrialized 
and fully integrated into Europe.
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If we adopt the day-to-day activities of a sales department manager as 
our point of reference, Karl Wirtz was not, strictly speaking, a sales rep-
resentative. He was not in charge of managing private businesses. He was 
not authorized to negotiate contracts or credits. He did not define distri-
bution channels or set prices, loans or interest charges for nuclear services 
and products. Nevertheless, his trips and meetings outside West Germany 
formed part of a long chain of public and private relationships that 
shaped the commercial and scientific ties between countries interested in 
implementing atomic programmes.44
From 1972 to 1979, Wirtz served as an organizer and consultant to the 
West German federal government regarding the transfer of nuclear tech-
nology from West Germany to Spain. The reasons cited for his appoint-
ment were his scientific qualifications and his familiarity with the Spanish 
market. Wirtz’s contact with the JEN dated to the creation of the Board, 
as recalled by Otero Navascués, with whom Wirtz had shared a ‘close 
friendship’ since 1949. But who was Karl Wirtz (1910–1994)? Receiving 
his doctorate in physical chemistry in 1934 as a heavy-water specialist, 
Wirtz had completed his academic training in the tumultuous context of 
the purge of Jewish scientists and any other scientist believed to oppose 
the Nazi dictatorship. In 1937, he became an assistant at the Physics 
Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. As late as September 1939 he 
maintained international contacts with British and American colleagues, 
which the war would later end.45
‘I have done that.’ ‘I conducted the negotiations with the firms.’ ‘I 
have done the experimental work.’ These were statements that Wirtz 
made sure he emphasized during the Farm Hall interrogations. A cottage 
located near Cambridge in England, Farm Hall was the internment cen-
tre to which Wirtz was taken in 1945 with the other scientists who had 
worked on the Third Reich’s atom bomb project. Werner Heisenberg, 
Otto Hahn and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker all spent time there. 
Ambition, lack of humility and a combination of scientific skills and the 
ability to communicate with firms were elements of the image that Wirtz 
projected of himself. He seemed optimistic as well, stating that the odds 
of him and his colleagues making a quick return to Germany were 70%, 
in contrast with Heisenberg’s doubts. Although Wirtz came to believe 
that he and the others would be taken to the USA to work, in early 1946 
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Wirtz and the rest of the group returned to Göttingen in the British 
occupation zone amidst post-war difficulties and at a time when the city 
was teeming with refugees.46 The scientific reconstruction of Western 
Germany began before the establishment of West Germany as a state 
(1949). For example, the Max Planck Society was formed in the British 
zone in September 1946 and authorized in the other zones in 1948.47 
Albeit with difficulties, German nuclear scientists resumed their interna-
tional relationships quickly during the formative years of the interna-
tional nuclear community. Wirtz underwent a rapid denazification 
process and travelled to Brighton in September 1948 for the annual 
meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In 
1949, he was invited to visit the University of Melbourne (Australia). He 
spent the last few months of 1950 in Argentina invited by the Nuclear 
Energy Commission of that country, reestablishing contact with former 
colleagues there who would later return to West Germany. Thanks to the 
efforts of the French chemist Bertrand Goldschmidt, and not without 
causing tensions, Wirtz attended a conference on reactor technology in 
Kjeller (Norway) in 1953. There he met Alwin Weinberg of the American 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In fact, he never cut ties with his former 
colleagues who joined the American scientific system, and he made his 
first trip to the USA in 1955. He returned a year later, joined by the head 
of the DEMAG corporation, which merged with Atomics International 
to form the Interatom corporation.48
Wirtz’s international presence played a part in the first Adenauer gov-
ernment’s interest in the nuclear economy, despite the fact that the Paris 
Accords, along with other legal measures, prohibited nuclear production 
and research in Germany for civil and military uses until 1955 and the 
enrichment of uranium until 1960.49 The initial relationships and 
exchanges created shared social spaces for industrialists and scientists, such 
as the Society for the Study of Physics (Physikalische Studiengesellschaft, 
PSG) founded in Düsseldorf in 1954. Although he had already started to 
form a group of young scientists and engineers in Göttingen, Wirtz lever-
aged the PSG to assemble a reactor research group, which he moved to 
Karlsruhe.50 As a professor and director of the Institute for Neutron Physics 
and Reactor Technology, he later presided over the scientific council of the 
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre (Kernforschungzentrum Karlsruhe, 
 Engineers and Scientists as Commercial Agents of the Spanish… 
328 
KfK) in Baden-Württemberg until 1978, an institution that with the Jülich 
Research Centre (Kernforschungsanlage Jülich, KfA) in North Rhein-
Westphalia was one of two scientific, academic and incubator sites for 
research and  development in this sector.51 The advances that emerged from 
the KfK included a new uranium enrichment technology similar to Erwin 
W. Becker’s nozzle process, and utilized by the Steag AG Corporation, and 
a system for monitoring fuel movements, which was conceived by Wirtz 
and enhanced by Wolf Häfele. From 1956 to 1971, Wirtz was a member 
of the German Atomic Commission, and he directed that agency’s ‘reactor 
circle’ until 1966. He also contributed to designing Germany’s first and 
second atomic programmes. The relevance of this complex institutional, 
public and private framework lies in the implicit, constant cooperation it 
represents between the scientific system and the firms that shared the stra-
tegic objective of internationalization despite conflicts over development 
and financing.52
In this historical context, Wirtz came to play the role of mediator 
between scientific institutions and nuclear firms in Spain and West 
Germany, although Spain was not the only hub of his international activ-
ity. The first step along this path consisted of academic collaboration. 
Relationships with Spain were resumed immediately after the war in 
Göttingen to enable Spanish physicists to research their doctoral theses.53 
Otero Navascués travelled there in 1949, having taken an interest in the 
German pioneers of reactor technology. In March 1950, the newspaper 
Die Welt reported that Wirtz would travel to Madrid at the request of the 
Franco government to assist in the establishment of a cosmic radiation 
laboratory. The article was referring to the future research centre of the 
JEN in Moncloa, which was intended to replicate the UK’s Harwell  centre 
and France’s Saclay centre.54 Additionally, Wirtz was one of the first for-
eign lecturers at the Applied Nuclear Physics Course organized by the 
Spanish National Research Council (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas, CSIC) between November 1950 and July 1951. According to 
Aschmann, the interest of the National Institute of Industry (Instituto 
Nacional de Industria, INI) in acquiring German scientific and engineer-
ing know-how figured in the background of that first trip.55 In fact, 
Manuel Espinosa Rodriguez, former naval attaché to the embassy in 
Berlin, travelled to the three Western occupation zones to rekindle former 
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relationships and recruit specialized technicians. To this end, Lieutenant 
Ignacio Moyano wired approximately US $30,000 from the Spanish 
Institute of Foreign Currency (IEME) to the Bank Deutscher Länder in 
Frankfurt. Ten scientists expressed interest, including Wirtz.56 In the 
1950s, Wirtz made additional trips to Spain and corresponded with 
Otero Navascués, Maria Aranzazu Vigón, Carlos Sanchez del Río (JEN) 
and Romero Ortiz (Geological and Mining Institute).57 At the founda-
tion established with JEN, Spanish scientific experts, politicians, and 
commercial managers started to closely interact in atomic programmes 
and national and international forums. During the early stages, the 
search for uranium and other nuclear fuel was prioritized. Later, between 
1955 and 1960, Wirtz advised JEN on test reactor development, arguing 
in favour of natural uranium to avoid dependence on the American 
monopoly on enriched uranium, just as France, the UK and West 
Germany were seeking to do. Wirtz also negotiated with the German 
Nuclear Affairs Ministry to obtain financing for JEN.  In 1958, he 
attended the inauguration in Moncloa of the experimental reactor 
acquired from GE.58
Wirtz recognized that his interventions in the 1950s were showing 
results in the scientific realm but that he would only begin to prosper in 
commercial terms in the long run, specifically in the 1960s. However, 
Spanish–German relations weakened in the early 1960s primarily because 
German industry remained incapable of exporting a nuclear power plant. 
A secondary reason for these weakened relations was likely the fact that 
the main atomic products at the time, power plants, were controlled by 
multinationals from other industrial powers. In Spain, while Vandellós 
was a French project, Zorita and Garoña were the work of American cor-
porations, WESCO and GE, where MacVeigh and Cortines were pio-
neering the nuclear business in which they would eventually meet Wirtz.
During this period of nuclear optimism, improving the technological 
capacity of reactors and ensuring a sufficient fuel supply posed new chal-
lenges. Thus the fast reactor and the fuel cycle occupied a substantial por-
tion of the scientific, diplomatic and commercial nuclear agenda in the 
USA and Europe. In fact, Wirtz and Häfele expressed their scientific 
 interest in advanced, or fast, reactor prototypes at the KfK beginning in 
the late 1950s. Such prototypes were not exclusively a German  development 
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but were included in the scientific plans of the leading nations. In 1960, 
financing for the project was approved by the German Atomic Commission. 
The effort’s financial and technical complexity required multilateral col-
laboration and support from the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom).59 Another business opportunity that drew together scientific 
research and the nuclear industry was the fuel cycle. Amidst rapid expan-
sion, progress had to be made in enriched uranium manufacturing for 
existing power plants and particularly for future technologies for electro-
nuclear production, an essential process subject to the US and Soviet duo-
poly of that time.
The fast breeder and nuclear fuel manufacturing had been prominent 
among the concerns of Minister of Industry Lopez Bravo since at least 
1966, and these matters were addressed by G.  Soltenberg and Otero 
Navascués during their visit to the uranium mines of Andújar that year.60 
At that time, there were already Spanish scientists in the KfA and the KfK 
in West Germany. The correspondence between Wirtz and Sanchez del 
Rio, the head of JEN’s Nuclear Physics and Chemistry Division, reveals 
their close collaboration on the fast breeder.61 In 1968, Wirtz travelled to 
Madrid with five collaborators to manage JEN’s participation in the 
Projekt Schneller Brüter (PSB).62 This scientific and technical coopera-
tion was extended in 1970.63 However, JEN was not the only organiza-
tion involved in the project. The PSB had also attracted Unión Eléctrica 
Madrileña, SA (UEM), the developer of the Zorita nuclear power plant 
and its expansion. Wirtz kept in touch with the old MacVeigh circuit in 
Tecnatom and UEM.64
The second entry point to the atomic entrepreneurial ecosystem was 
nuclear fuel manufacturing. A September 1968 entry in Wirtz’s travel 
diary described at length his contacts with the leadership of JEN, making 
note of the individuals he referred to as ‘Mir wichtiger Industriemänner’, 
that is ‘men of industry who are important to me’: López Bravo, Cortines, 
Oriol, Urquijo, Kaibel, Sendagorta, Mendoza and Millán, among others. 
In institutional terms, this list referred to the Ministry of Industry, the 
Atomic Forum and several of the firms involved in nuclear projects: 
Ibernuclear, Hidroelectrica Española, Sener Consulting, the Spanish 
Society for Naval Construction, Unesa and Babcock & Wilcox Spain. 
Wirtz added: ‘López Bravo has influence over Cortines’ decision about 
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fuel manufacturing.’ The scientist was well informed. The minister’s 
efforts resulted in the creation of Ibernuclear, a mixed partnership (70% 
private and 30% public) that was managed by Cortines, ‘the most impor-
tant man at the time’.65 This partnership was placed in charge of site 
studies for a fuel plant for light water natural uranium reactors.66 In fact, 
Cortines had contacted Heinrich Mandel of the West Germany electric-
ity utility Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk  (RWE) and visited 
Wolfgang, the headquarters of Schimmelbusch’s NUKEM  (Nuklear- 
Chemie- Metallurgie).67 He also visited the headquarters of the KfK, 
where he was joined by the head of the UEM, Julio Hernández Rubio.68
Under the mandate of López de Letona, the Ministry of Industry, the 
INI and the electricity  utilities promoted the National Uranium Enterprise 
(Empresa Nacional del Uranio, ENUSA) as a fuel manufacturer and 
expanded contacts with foreign industries that possessed that technologi-
cal capacity. Such was the case with the Kraftwerk Union (KWU). Product 
of a merger of the reactor departments of the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-
Gesellschaft (AEG) and Siemens, KWU began to submit bids in 1969 to 
construct reactors in international calls for tenders and presented offers in 
Spain for the nuclear power plants in Almaraz, Lemoniz, Ascó and 
Cofrentes. Managers led these international relationships. However, they 
did so in close communication with the diplomatic services and institu-
tions such as the KfK through the Society for Atomic Research (Gesellschaft 
für Kernforschung, GfK).69 The first agreement between the GfK and JEN 
was signed in Madrid in 1973. Foreign Minister López Rodó and Wirtz 
were in attendance, along with Greifeld (GfK), Sánchez del Río, Oltra 
(JEN) and representatives of Interatom, which still belonged to KWU.70 
However, the challenge of obtaining an important nuclear contract in 
Spain would remain unmet until 1975. Although Wirtz was not the deci-
sive actor, he represented an important player in a complex process that 
would eventually enable KWU to construct the Trillo nuclear power plant, 
the only such plant to be built by a German corporation in a booming 
market that was practically monopolized by American firms.71 A 1976 let-
ter to the KWU president in which Wirtz offered contacts in Galicia to 
help KWU win the call for tenders for the Regodola nuclear power plant 
reveals that the context had changed.72 By the mid-1970s, business man-
agers had become the key decision-makers in megaprojects.
 Engineers and Scientists as Commercial Agents of the Spanish… 
332 
Not every decision passed through Wirtz, and not all interventions 
were rewarded with success. However, his work as an enduring catalyst of 
public and private relationships in the international nuclear community 
was crucial in the rapprochement between German and Spanish firms and 
scientific institutions in the nuclear field. A bridge between nuclear scien-
tific knowledge and the Spanish and German entrepreneurial ecosystems, 
Wirtz made these connections part of his career and his activity with the 
KfK. He did so at times without complete information and aware of the 
limitations through collecting data and contacts, linking evidence and fos-
tering trust. How did he do it? By introducing himself into the lines of 
communication between key industrial actors and political decision-mak-
ers in Spain, by writing reports that he distributed to leaders of industry, 
politicians and scientists, providing information and his impressions of 
these meetings, and by constantly promoting scientific cooperation.
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